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Although thrust reversers are used for only a fraction of the airplane operating
time, their impact on nacelle design, weight, airplane cruise performance, and
overall airplane operating and maintenance expenses is significant. Why then
do the airlines want and use thrust reversers? In an effort to understand the
airlines need for thrust reversers, the NASA Langley Aircraft Deceleration Study
Group put together an airline questionnaire inquiring as to why and under what
situations thrust reversers are currently used or thought to be needed. The
survey was also intended to help establish the cost/benefits trades for the use
of thrust reversers and airline opinion regarding alternative deceleration
devices. A compilation and summary of the responses given by the airlines is
presented.
INTRODUCTION
Aircraft deceleration systems for commercial transport airplanes have been
identified by the commercial transport industry as an area in need of a
"technology injection". The decelerating forces available on current
commercial transports consist of wheel brakes, aerodynamic braking (such as
flaps and speedbrakes) and thrust reversers. As shown in figure 1, the
contribution of thrust reversers in terms of decreased stopping distance is
small on a dry runway, but can be significant on contaminated runways when
wheel braking effectiveness is greatly diminished.
Although the thrust reverser system is used for only a fraction of the airplane
operating time, its impact on nacelle design, weight, airplane cruise
performance, and overall operating and maintenance expenses is significant.
Preliminary design studies conducted by General Electric Aircraft Engines
indicate that the thrust reverser system accounts for more than 30 percent of
the nacelle weight (not including engine) for an engine having a fan diameter in
excess of 100 inches. This could be as much as 1500 Ib for a GE 90 class
engine. In addition, the installation of a thrust reverser system is estimated to
increase the engine specific fuel consumption (SFC) by 0.5 to 1.0 percent as a
result of leakage and pressure drops. The Boeing Commercial Airplane
Company has estimated the total cost of using thrust reversers on a B-767 at
about $125,000 per airplane per year (includes amortization of initial costs).
The savings associated with reduced brake wear due to the use of thrust
reversers does not approach this expense. Thrust reversers are also noisy and
have the potential for the reverser efflux to blow debris into the path of the
airplane posing the risk of foreign object damage (FOD) and/or reduced
visibility.
A deceleration system that employs engine power does offer some advantages
over an aerodynamic braking system in that large retarding forces can be
developed at low speeds when aerodynamic drag forces drop off significantly.
However, due to reingestion concerns, thrust reversers are typically not used at
speeds below about 60 knots. To achieve the greatest affect on deceleration,
thrust reversers should be used at high speeds when the kinetic energy of the
airplane is greatest and braking/retarding forces are most effective at
decelerating the airplane.
Thrust reverser systems represent a considerable cost to the commercial
transport operator in terms of fuel burned and maintenance expenses for an
item that is used only for a fraction of the total airplane operating time. Why
then do the airlines want and use thrust reversers? Thrust reversers are not
used during aircraft certification, nor are they required by FAA regulations.
Thrust reversers are offered by the airframers as a backup to the airplane brake
system and have become common place on nearly all turbofan powered
commercial transport aircraft (one exception being the BAe 146]. Although not
required by regulation or for certification, the elimination of the thrust
reversers would be difficult because of the added safety margins (albeit small)
they provide in the event of an emergency.
In response to industry concems about improving aircraft deceleration
systems, the NASA Langley Research Center's Applied Aerodynamics Division
formed the Aircraft Deceleration Study Group to address alternative ways of
decelerating a commercial transport airplane during landing and refused
takeoffs (RTO). Members of the working group included representatives from
NASA, the FAA, airframe companies, engine companies, and thrust reverser
manufacturers. In an effort to understand the need for thrust reversers, the
study group put together an airline questionnaire to determine why airlines
want thrust reversers and in what situations thrust reversers are currently used
or thought to be needed. The survey was also intended to help establish the
cost/benefits trades for the use of thrust reversers and to help establish the
airline opinion regarding alternative deceleration devices. It was felt that since
thrust reversers represent the state-of-the-art in supplemental stopping
systems, a good understanding of how the airlines use thrust reversers would
be useful in formulating aircraft deceleration requirements.
The questionnaire was sent to nearly all domestic airlines as well as major
foreign airlines serving the United States. A list of the airlines surveyed is
presented in Table I. A total of 64 questionnaires were sent out to the chief
engineer of the domestic airlines or to the manager of the U. S. office of each
foreign airline. A total of 22 airlines responded (34 percent) and are identified
in Table I by boldface type. The titles and job functions of the respondents
(those who completed the survey) are listed in Table II. The respondents
represent a diverse cross-section of airline operating organizations, including
engineering, maintenance, flight operations, and management. The airlines
responding also provide a good representation of airline size and regions of the
world.
A sample of the questionnaire sent to the airlines is presented in figure 2.
survey was organized into the following four parts:
* Thrust Reverser Utilization
• Economic Considerations
• Safety Considerations
• Alternative Concepts
The
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This format was used to organize the questions around the three primary
considerations for using thrust reversers and to seek initial reactions to
alternative deceleration concepts. A "block" format was used in an effort to
reduce the time required to complete the survey.
Compilations of the airline responses to each question are presented in figures
3 through 25. The responses have been tabulated without reference to the
specific airline in an effQrt to keep the responses confidential. The actual
airline responses are presented in quotations (i.e. " ... "). Editorial comments
and explanations by the author are enclosed in brackets (i.e. [ ... ]). The
following discussion of the responses is organized according to the
questionnaire format and the individual questions.
PART I - THRUST REVERSER UTILIZATION
The first section of the questionnaire addresses why and how the airlines use
thrust reversers. The first question posed to the airlines was "why do we have
thrust reversers?" (Question 1, see figure 3). The number one reason given by
the airlines was to provide additional stopping forces in adverse weather
conditions (i.e. on wet, slushy or slippery runways). The airlines also use thrust
reversers to reduce brake wear and to provide directional control and
additional safety margins during an aborted takeoff (RTO).
When the airlines were asked who they perceived as the principal organization
behind the installation of thrust reversers on commercial transport aircraft
(Question 2, see figure 4), the airlines responded that they were. That is, the
aircraft manufacturers put the systems on board the airplanes because the
airlines want them. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not
require thrust reversers for airplane certification. The definition of certified
landing distances per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25.125 is presented in
figure 5.
Working group discussions suggested that there might be differences among
the airlines as to how they instruct their pilots to use thrust reversers. The
airlines were therefore asked to indicate their policy for using thrust reversers
(Question 3, see figure 6). Most airlines deploy thrust reversers on every
landing. The thrust reverser operating guidelines are well established and are
typically based on inputs from the airframe manufacturer. Although most
airlines deploy thrust reversers on every landing, the level of reverse thrust
used is left to the pilots discretion. Most airlines instruct their pilots to put
the reverser into idle reverse whether he intends to use the reverser or not.
It should be noted that most airlines recognize that since thrust reversers are
available they should be used to reduce brake wear. Pilots are therefore
instructed to use reverse thrust early in the landing sequence (high speed) so
as to minimize the amount of wheel braking required.
It had been suggested that some airlines might have a policy of limiting the use
of thrust reversers to emergencies only (Question 4, see figure 7). Of the
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airlines responding, the policy of limiting the use of thrust reversers to
"emergencies only" is not a common practice.
Regarding the use of reverse thrust (Question 5, see figure 8), pilots are
instructed to deploy thrust reversers as soon as possible upon landing (after
speedbrakes deploy). The airlines typically operate engines at 70 to 80
percent power with cutoff speeds between 60 and 80 knots to prevent
problems associated with engine surge, reingestion and tail blanking. A sample
engine operating line depicting thrust reverser usage is shown in figure 9.
Examples of engine thrust limits and cutoff speeds used by various airlines are
presented in figure 10. Weathervaning I in crosswinds can also affect the
amount of reverser thrust used. Sample comments regarding the use of thrust
reversers, extracted from the material provided by the airlines, are presented
in Table III.
The working group was interested in how the use of thrust reversers might
affect the set-up of the aircraft brake system (Question 6, see figure 12). The
typical transport brake system consists of an anti-skid system and an autobrake
system (ABS), each operating independent of the other. The function of the
anti-skid system is to modulate the individual wheel brake pressure to achieve
maximum braking effectiveness for the current runway condition. The anti-
skid system senses wheel speed and adjusts brake pressure accordingly to
prevent wheel lockup. The availability and/or use of thrust reversers has no
impact at all on the design and function of the anti-skid system.
The autobrake system senses aircraft deceleration rate and modulates brake
system pressure to maintain a constant preselected deceleration rate. The
application of reverse thrust will result in reduced braking by the ABS system.
The availability of the thrust reverser indirectly affects the use of the autobrake
system in that the braking action required for a given deceleration rate is
reduced when thrust reversers are used. To save on brake wear some airlines
instruct their pilots not to use ABS except during adverse weather conditions.
Examples of autobrake system settings are presented in figure 13.
As previously stated, the need for thrust reversers is most critical in adverse
weather conditions. The airlines were asked how often they encounter "icy"
conditions (Question 7, see figure 14). Airlines serving northern localities land
on "icy" runways about 20% of the time while the typical airline operates in
"icy" conditions about 2% to 5% of the time. Airlines divert to altemative
airports less than 1% of the time as a result of poor weather. It should be
noted that the wide variation in percentages given by the airlines is probably
due to the definition of "icy" runway. Airlines use the term "slippery" for
runway conditions that are worse than "wet". The definition of a slippery
runway is - substantially covered with slush or with snow/ice and not sanded to
provide satisfactory braking.
1 Weathervaning (see figure 11) is defined as the condition where the reverse thrust
side force component combines with the crosswind component to cause the airplane to
yaw into the wind. This condition is alleviated by reducing the reverse thrust level and
compensating with opposite rudder or differential braking.
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Refused takeoffs (RTO's) were also identified as a primary reason for having
thrust reversers on commercial transport aircraft. When asked how often
RTO's are encountered (Question 8, see figure 15) the following conclusions
were formed. The frequency of RTO's average about 2 per 10,000 takeoffs.
The number of RTO's that occur on icy runways is probably about I per
I00,000 takeoffs. As supporting data, Aviation Week (May, 12, 1992) estimated
that by 1995 there will be about 6000 RTO's per year or an average of 16 per
day. The average short haul pilot (short range flights, with numerous landings
per day) is likely to make a RTO once every three years.
The airlines were asked about specific procedures for operating on "icy"
runways (Question 9, see figure 16). Landing/takeoff on "icy" {e.g.. unsanded)
runways is often not permitted. Takeoffs on "slippery" runways require
adjustments in gross weight and the RTO decision speed (V1) for a balanced
field length. These adjustments take into account the availability of thrust
reversers. Some airlines restrict operation on "slippery" runways ff thrust
reversers are inoperative.
The airlines were asked how often they encountered brake system failures
(Question 10, see figure 17). The responses received ranged from none to as
many as 83. The reason for this wide variation is that the term "brake failure"
is subjective. Complete brake system failures are rare. Each airline operates
according to an FAA approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL). As such, the
airlines are allowed to operate with some portion (usually 1 or 2) of the
individual wheel brakes inoperative (a partial failure). To do so, the airlines are
required to make reductions to the airplane takeoff gross weight, V I, and
increase the required runway landing length.
There appears to be no requirement for thrust reversers to be operational
when a portion of the brake system is deactivated. During a follow up
telephone conversation, one of the respondents suggested that the if thrust
reversers were not available (not installed on the airplane) then further weight
reductions might be required.
Another reason often given for why thrust reversers are put on airplanes is for
power back from the terminal gate. The airlines were asked to state their
policy regarding the use of thrust reversers for power back (Question 11, see
figure 18). The responses indicate that for reasons of ground safety, noise, and
air pollution most airlines do not use thrust reversers for power back. A small
minority of airlines do power back to minimize ground handling equipment and
ground crew personnel requirements. In practice, power backs are typically
limited to aircraft with relatively small (low thrust) tail mounted engines
(B727, DC9, MD80, F100). Power back is not used on aircraft with the larger
high bypass turbofans engines because of the large amount of air movement
involved.
Airlines that do use thrust reversers for power back typically limit the engine
power level used and require that all reversers be operational. For visibility
concerns there must be no loose contaminants (i.e. snow) or heavy rain on the
ramp. An additional issue regarding power back is a "tail tip". Brakes are never
applied during the roll back and forward thrust is used to stop the airplane.
Since thrust reversers directly affect landing distances, the airlines were asked
if field length was critical to their operations and route structure (Question 12,
see figure 19). Field length is often critical to the airlines, particularly with
larger aircraft, airports with short runways, and under adverse weather
conditions.
Heavy braking (high deceleration rate) during landings often lead passengers to
assume that the pilot is trying to make the first taxiway cutoff or to get to the
terminal gate "on time". The airlines were asked whether or not "on-time
arrival" had any affect on their policy for using thrust reversers (Question 13,
see figure 20). The airlines do not promote the practice of a quick egress from
the runway to meet scheduled arrival times. This practice would in fact be
contrary to their desire to minimize brake wear. In practice however,
air/ground controllers do request that the runway be cleared quickly during
busy arrival/departure periods.
PART H - ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Working group discussions suggested that the use of thrust reversers increased
the engine maintenance cost as a result of the increase in the number of
operating cycles on the engine. The airlines were asked how the use of thrust
reversers affected their engine maintenance schedules (Question 14, see figure
21). The responses and follow-up telephone conversations indicate that
engine maintenance schedules are typically based on a combination of engine
hours and cycles. In effect, the engine cycles per flight are factored into the
flight hour referenced maintenance schedules for each aircraft type. Thrust
reverser maintenance activities are performed along with routine (scheduled)
engine and airframe inspections. The schedules used for typical pylon
mounted thrust reversers (i.e. cascade reversers) for high bypass engines
coincide with airframe inspections. The schedules used for engine mounted
thrust reversers (i.e. clamshell reversers) coincide with engine inspections.
Therefore, thrust reversers do not directly impact airframe or powerplant
maintenance schedules.
It should also be noted that an engine cycle is defined as a flight cycle where a
takeoff and landing (or RTO) was made. The deployment of the thrust reverser
and a change in engine power setting during landing is not considered an
additional engine cycle. An engine ground run-up for maintenance checkout
would also not be counted as an engine cycle. This definition is used
throughout the airline industry.
Engine cycles are important when it comes to the turbine disc and the number
of mechanical cycles experienced. Turbine blade tip wear due to thermal
cycles is critical to engine performance, not to mechanical reliability. Tip wear
causes engine performance losses which show up as higher exhaust gas
temperatures (and eventually an over temperature) when setting maximum
power.
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The airlines were asked what they consider the cost/benefits trades for thrust
reversers to be (Question 15, see figure 22). The reduction in brake wear due
to the use of thrust reversers is typically quoted at about 25 percent.
Reductions in brake temperatures also impact aircraft ground turn around
time. It is generally recognized that brake system costs are less than thrust
reverser maintenance expenses. However, this trade is largely dependent on
the aircraft type and age, and could affect the cost/benefits conclusions. Since
the airlines consider thrust reversers necessary for safe airplane operation,
they have not made a rigorous cost assessment.
During follow-up discussions, Airline 17 provided the following breakdown of
brake system maintenance cost for their entire fleet and for two airplane types
in particular:
Entire fleet (projected for 1992) = $25 million
DC-10 = $12.9 million (54 airplanes @ $238,889 per airplane)
B-747 = $3.1 million (52 airplanes @ $59,615 per airplane)
Rest of fleet = $9.0 million (382 airplanes @ $23,560 per airplane)
These data show that the brake system costs vary significantly with airplane
type.
An estimate of the savings in brake system costs attributable to the use of thrust
reversers was made using the data above. A summary of the calculations and a
breakdown of the cost per airplane is shown in Table IV. The first two columns
represent the fleet make up of the airline. A duty factor (DF), defined as the
number of flights per day per aircraft type, was assumed so that the total
number of landings (sum of column 5) matched the number provided in
Question 7 (see figure 14). The number of landings per airplane was then
computed for each airplane type. Using the cost numbers given above for the
DC-10 and B-747 an estimate of the brake system cost for the other airplane
types was made. An initial estimate was made based on the landing kinetic
energy corresponding to the published landing weights and landing speeds for
each airplane type. The average brake cost per landing was then adjusted
(considering airplane service age and relative size) until the total fleet brake
costs matched the total given above. Although this approach is only a gross
approximation, the relative magnitudes of the per airplane costs are thought to
be representative and are in general agreement with the responses given to
question 15. Using a brake savings factor of 25 percent, the savings in brake
system costs due to the use of thrust reversers was estimated. The results
show that the total yearly savings in brake system costs is about $8.6 million, or
an average of about $17,700 per airplane for airline 17.
When asked if they thought that thrust reversers were cost effective (Question
16, see figure 23), the nearly unanimous airline response was yes. Due to the
safety aspect and added margins when operating in adverse weather conditions
thrust reversers are considered cost effective. There was also an implied
consensus among the airlines that thrust reversers provided an adequate
(though sometimes intangible) return on investment (ROI). Airline 17 also
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provided an additional operating expense; the increase in fuel costs attributed
to the weight of the thrust reverser averages about $6,000 per year.
To settle the cost/benefits issue, the airlines were asked to provide estimates
of what it costs to maintain thrust reversers (Question 17, see figure 24). As
shown in the table below, the responses ranged from $10,000 to $187,000 per
airplane per year, with an average cost was about $53,000. The actual costs
depend on the type of thrust reverser system (complexity) and age of the
airplane.
Maintenance Cost per Airplane per Year
Brake Thrust
System Reversers
Airline 3 n/a $100,000
Airline 4 $29,500 $31,000
Airline 7 n/a $30,000
Airline 9 n/a $20,000
Airline 11 $33,000 n/a
Airline 12 n/a $40,000
Airline 13 n/a $187,000
Airline 16 n/a $27,500
Airline 17 $53,000 est $12,000
Airline 22 n/a $27,000
Ave rage $ 38,500
Brake Wear
Savings $12,800
$53,000
Estimates for brake system maintenance costs ranged from $29,500 to
$53,000 per aircraft/year, with an average cost of about $38,500 per
airplane/year. On the basis of a 25 percent savings in brake system costs due to
the use of thrust reversers, the total brake system costs without thrust
reversers would have been about $51,300 ($38,500/0.75). This translates to a
savings in brake system maintenance costs of about $12,800 per airplane/year.
The thrust reverser maintenance costs are considerably larger than the costs
associated with savings in brake wear. Comparing the average thrust reverser
maintenance cost ($53,000) to the average savings in brake system costs
($12,800), thrust reversers maintenance costs are more than four times the
savings in brake system costs. The use of thrust reversers solely on the basis of
a perceived savings in brake system maintenance costs does not appear to be a
valid justification.
8
" _ .,_ ,: , ' • • _L //i . r_,.
PART HI - SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
The airlines were asked if thrust reversers were necessary for safe operation
(Question 18, see figure 25). In general, the airlines feel that thrust reversers
provide an added margin of safety for transport aircraft operations. Most
airlines consider them essential to achieving the maximum level of operating
safety.
When asked if thrust reversers have ever actually prevented an accident
(question 19, see figure 26), the general implication was that any successful
landing made using thrust reversers during adverse weather conditions
demonstrates the benefits of thrust reversers. Most of the examples given
indicated that thrust reversers were sometimes used to prevent accidents
during ground operation. These examples emphasize a benefit of a powered
reverser system.
The airlines were asked if any problems had ever been encountered in stopping
an airplane after all thrust reversers had been locked out or made inoperative
(Question 20, see figure 27). Operating with the thrust reversers locked out
should not pose a problem for the safe operation of the airplane since it is
certified without credit for thrust reversers. No problems with stopping the
airplanes were reported. Typically, the MEL allows at least one thrust reverser
to be locked out on a dry runway without adjustments to operating weights,
speeds, etc.
It should be noted that during the period of time that the Boeing 767 thrust
reversers were locked out by a FAA ruling, weight penalties were imposed on
the airlines. For example, for a "cluttered" runway (1/2 inch of standing water
- thunderstorm) an 11,000 Ib gross weight penalty was imposed (-3%)]. This
suggests that changes in the certification process might be required for large
airplanes having no thrust reverser system.
Question 21 (figure 28) inquired about the types of problems typically
encountered with thrust reverser systems. The types of problems identified by
the respondents were:
Indicator problems
Inability to Deploy or Stow
Mechanical failure: Actuator, Blockers, Linkages, Cascades
Wear, Delamination of acoustic treatments
Leaks
Although the failure rates provided by the respondents are difficult to quantify,
they appear to be low, typically less than 3 per 1000 hours. The older the
airplane or more complex the system, the higher the failure (squawk) rates.
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PART IV- ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS
The airlines were asked what they thought of eliminating thrust reversers from
commercial transports (Question 22, see figure 29). The question stated that
the replacement system would be cost effective and a safe alternative. It was
implied that the alternative concept would have the same or better stopping
effectiveness. In general the respondents were not opposed to alternative
concepts. The airlines did indicated that such a system would have to provide
for:
• Directional control at high and low speeds, on slippery runways
and taxiways.
• Must be independent of runway friction
• Be flexible enough to used at pilots discretion (for the unforeseen events)
Numerous airlines are concemed about the expense of retrofitting existing
aircraft and were pessimistic about the likelihood of being able to develop an
alternative system. Retrofit costs and certification costs should be included in
any altemative system cost studies. [However, it was not the intent of the
Working Group to imply that retrofit was a goal.]
The final question dealt with what type of alternative deceleration concept the
airlines would be most interested in (Question 23, see figure 30). Of the
altemative concepts offered, the airlines were most interested in the variable
pitch fans. Reduced landing speeds via improved high lift systems was the
second choice, followed by airframe mounted drag devices and systems that
improved braking effectiveness. The airlines expressed little or no interest in
off-airplane devices such as taft hooks, nets, or extended runway overruns.
The airlines were encouraged to make additional comments which might be
pertinent to the survey. A summary of the specific comments received are
presented in figure 31. The ideas expressed were included in the discussions
above.
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CONCLUSIONS
The fonowingconclusions were formulated based on the airline responses to
the questionnaire.
Thrust Reverser Utiliz_tiQn
Thrust reversers are used to provide an additional stopping force on wet and
slippery runways.
Thrust reversers provide additional safety and control margins during
aborted takeoffs, landings, and ground operations.
The airlines are the main driver behind the use of thrust reversers on
commercial transport aircraft.
The airlines have specific guidelines as to how reversers should be used:
• Thrust reversers are usually deployed on every landing;
> Use of thrust reversers "in emergencies only" is not a common
practice.
• For maximum effectiveness thrust reversers are deployed as soon as
possible after touchdown.
• The amount of reverse thrust used is left to the pilots discretion;
> Most airlines use "normal" reverse thrust levels to reduce brake
loads.
> Specific limits on the maximum thrust levels to be used do exist.
Thrust reverser cutoff speeds are based on engine surge, reingestion and tail
blanking considerations.
The use of reverse thrust for quick egress from the runway is usually at the
request of ground controllers and is not a typical airline operating policy.
The number of airlines using thrust reversers for power back is limited:
• Not used for reasons of ground crew safety, noise, and air pollution.
• Used only on aircraft with smaller engines (i.e. Thrust < 30,000 Ib).
• Not likely to be used with larger high bypass turbofan engines.
The availability of thrust reversers has no bearing on the design and setup of
aircraft brake systems (anti-skid & autobrakes):
• Anti-skid systems must be fully functional in adverse weather
conditions per the minimum equipment lists (MEL).
• Thrust reversers reduce the amount of wheel braking performed when
the autobrake system is active.
• Autobrake stopping performance is better than that achievable with
manual braking.
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In temperate climates, landings are made in "icy" conditions about 2% of the
time and more than 20% of the time in more northern localities.
The frequency of refused takeoffs (RTO) is about 1 per 5000 takeoffs.
The frequency of refused takeoffs on "icy" runways is about I per 100,000
takeoffs.
Operation in adverse weather requires reductions in takeoff weight and the
aborted takeoff decision speed (V1):
• All thrust reversers must be operational per the MEL.
Total brake system failures are rare.
Aircraft are typically allowed to operate with at least one wheel brake
inoperable per the minimum equipment list:
• Adjustments to takeoff weight, V1 speed, and runway landing length
are required.
When the B767 was operated with all thrust reversers locked out, operating
weight penalties were imposed by FAA when operating on wet/slippery
runways. This suggests that certification changes may be required for future
airplanes built without thrust reversers.
Field lengths are often critical for heavy, long haul aircraft:
• Adverse weather creates additional critical field length situations.
Economic Considerations
Because of the added safety margins, the airlines consider thrust reversers
to be cost effective.
The use of thrust reversers has little impact on airline maintenance
schedules:
• Thrust reverser inspection/malntenance is typically performed as part
of normally scheduled airframe and powerplant inspection and
maintenance.
• Interim repairs are made on an as needed basis.
The use of thrust reversers reduces brake wear by about 25%.
The use of thrust reversers reduces brake temperatures and therefore
aircraft tum-around time.
The cost of thrust reversers and brakes is largely dependent on aircraft type
and age.
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Cost trades do not benefit the use of thrust reversers:
* Thrust reverser costs average about $53,000 per alrcraft/year.
* Brake system costs average about $39,000 per aircraft/year.
* The typical savings in brake system maintenance costs due to reduced
brake wear (25%) is about $12,800 per aircraft/year.
Estimated fuel cost to carry the additional weight of thrust reversers is about
$6,000 per aircraft/year.
Safety Considerations
The airlines consider thrust reversers essential to achieving the maximum
level of aircraft operating safety.
Typical problems encountered with thrust reversers are sensor or indicator
problems, inability to stow/deploy due to mechanical problems (valves,
actuator, linkages), wear, leaks, and acoustic treatment delaminations:
* Problems occur at a rate of less than 3 per 1000 flight hours.
Examples were given of situations where the use of thrust reversers
prevented an accident during ground operation (slippery taxiways).
Concerns for aircraft controllability at low speeds and on slippery runways
and taxiways were also expressed.
• This emphasizes the need/benefits for a powered thrust reverser
system for optimum safety and operability.
Alternative Deceleration System Concepts
Alternative deceleration systems concepts might be considered as
supplemental systems, rather than as replacements for thrust reversers.
Airlines expressed most interest in variable pitch fans, high lift systems
which reduce landing speeds, and altemative high drag devices.
Little interest was expressed towards alternative methods of reversing
engine thrust and ground based stopping systems.
Alternative deceleration systems must offer the same or higher levels of
safety, reliability, and operational flexibility.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
January, 1995
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UNITED STATES
Air Wisconsin
Alaska Airlines
Aloha Airlines
American Airlines
America Trans Air
America West Airlines
Continental Airlines
Delta Airlines
Emory Worldwide
Federal Express
Hawaiian Airlines
Northwest Airlines
Southwest Airlines
Trans World Airlines
United Airlines
UPS of America
USAir
CANADA & MEXICO
Air Atlantic
Air Canada
Canadian Airlines Intl.
Aeromexico
Mexicana Airlines
ASIA & PACIFIC
Air India
Air New Zealand
All Nippon Airways
Ansett Australia
Australian Airlines LTD
Cathay Pacific Airways (H. K.)
China Airlines (Taiwan)
Japan Airlines
Korean Air
Qantas Airways (Australia)
Singapore Airlines
Thai Airways
MIDDLE EAST
Egyptair
E1 A1 Israel Airlines Ltd
Kuwait Airways
Middle East Airlines
(Lebanon)
Royal Jordanian Airlines
Saudi Arabian Airlines
AFRICA
Ethopian Airlines
Nigeria Airways
Royal Air Maroc (Morocco)
South African Airways
Zambia Airways
EUROPE
Aer Lingus (Ireland)
Air France
AUtaUa (Italy)
Austrian Airlines
British Airways, PLC
Finnair
Iberia Airlines (Spain)
Icelandair
KLM - Royal Dutch Airlines
Lufthansa German Airlines
Olympic Airlines (Greece)
Sabena (Belgium)
SAS (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden)
Swissair
Virgin Atlantic Airways (GB)
SOUTH AMERICA
Aerolineas Argentinas
Avianca (Colombia)
Ladeco Airlines (Chile)
LAN Chile Airlines
Varig Airlines (Brazil)
Table I. List of airlines surveyed and the airlines who responded (respondants in bold type).
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Maintenance Prod. Manager
Manager Power Plant Engineering
(unknown)
Specialist Engineer - Powerplant Engineering
Manager Powerplant Engineering
General Manager - Performance & Products Engineering
V. P. Maintenance & Engineering
Project Engineer, Development & Operations Engineering
Manager Flight Ops Eng & Development,
Director of Flight Operations
Vice President, Engineering Department
V. P. Ground Services - The Americas
(unknown)
Asst Director of Flight Operations (Line Operations)
Technical Pilot, MD-11
Staff Vice President - Engineering & Quality Control
Director, Engineering Systems & Standards
Chief Pilot
Project & Development Manager
Technical and Air Safety Manager (Airline Captain)
Manager Powerplant Engineering
Operations Engineering Group
Table II. Position help by airline representatives answering survey.
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The importance of establishing the desired reverse thrust level as soon as possible after
touchdown, to minimize brake temperatures and tire and brake wear and to reduce
stopping distances on very slippery runways, cannot be overemphasized.
(Ref: 757/767 AOM)
The use of minimum reverse thrust significantly increases the brake energy
requirements and can result in brake temperatures much higher than normal.
(Ref: 737-300/500 Flight Manual)
The use of minimum reverse thrust will almost double the brake energy requirements
and can result in brake temperatures much higher than normal. (Ref: A300 AOM)
No go-around after reverser deployed (reverser may not stow).
Crosswind landings can be aggravated by use of thrust reverser (weathervaning).
Pilots should use at least idle reverse on all landings. (Ref: MD80 AOM)
Adequate reverse thrust is generally recommended to minimize the use of brakes
during the high speed portion of the landing roll.
When landing on long dry runways use reverse thrust as the primary method of slowing
the airplane. Use manual braking in preference to the autobrake system.
(Ref: B-747 Flight Manual)
If yaw develops (due to "tail blanking") which cannot be controlled by use of rudder,
return to forward idle until directional control is regained. (Ref: MD80 AOM)
B727 EPR limits imposed by "tall blanking" and reingestion considerations.
For MD-11's, some airlines limits use of the thrust reverser on the no. 2 engine
(center) to idle reverse under normal operating conditions.
Set normal reverse on contaminated runways (ref: MD-11 AOM)
Table III - Typical airline instructions regarding the use of thrust reversers.
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AlP
Type
B 727
B 737
B 747
B 757
B 767
DC 10
Totals
of
AlP
,o...=... ..........
115
_,..o,o,.._..,...o_
196
• ,.......,.. ........ •
.......52 ......
.......4.7.......
.... • .,.,,.o*.o,,o,_
......
..... _,o.,,,......_
54 i
48.8
Duty I
Factor
(DF) No.* DF
5 575.0
5 980.0
1 52.0
2.5 117.5
2.5 60.0
2 108.0
1892.5
I No. of JLandingsLandings per/UP
236077
402357
21350
48242
24634
44341
777000
2053
2053
411
1026
1026
821
Total Landings / (No. * DF) = 410.6
DF = Assumed duty factor (no. of flights per day)
Landing
Weight
(Ib) (mph) I
...... .....,,.**..,,. ......... ...,,,... .......... ,
_!4.8000.........1 42.. ....
,..!.3...9._.9._.........1 ..5..3.. ..
550000 160
....o,....,,, ............. ...,.*,*...,,,, ........ .
198000 152
........ ......
380000 160
Maximum
Kinetic
Energy
(ft-lb)
9.98E+07
1.02E+08
4.71E+08
1.53E+08
2.35E+08
3.25E+08
Brake J
Cost
per
Landing
$14
$10
.......................
.....=.145....
$25
$56
....$..2.9..o......j
Total
Brake
Cost
$3,305,073
$4,023,567
$3,095,683
$1,206,044
$1,379,509
$12,858,991
$25,868,865
g.o.lL_ama_
Total Brake Cost : $25,868,865
Average Brake Cost per Aircraft per Year : $53,010
Total Savings at 25% of Brake Costs = $8,622,093
Average Savings per Aircraft per Year = $17,668
Brake
Cost per
Aircraft
Savings/AP
Using 25 %
Reduction in
Brake Costs
$28,740
$20,528
$59,532
$25,661
$57,480
$238,129
$9,579
$6,842
$19,842
$8,553
$19,158
$79,369
I--,=
.,,1
Table IV. Estimate of brake system cost and savings on the basis of aimraft type.
Aircraft Landing on a Dry Runway
Source: General Electric Aircraft Engines
FAN REVERSER+ HOT
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IO0
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60
40
20
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BRAKE_ //._/_
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1
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DISTANCE THOUSAND FEET
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Figure 1.
a. Dry runway.
Aircraft landing distances on dry and icy runways.
Aircraft Landing on a Icy Runway
CO
Source: General Electric Aircraft Engines
FAN REVERSER+
WORK BONE
" % INITIAL
ENERGY
H0T SPOILER
m
100
80
60
40
20
U HA K E_ _////F
A_RODYNAMIC DRAG :--.;--:-.:.
ENGINES I REVERSER
I INLET MOMENTUM :!i!!ii::i!_i_!_!_i__
1 23"
TOUCHDOWN
NO REVERSER,
5 6 7-8 9101112
DISTANCE- THOUSAND FEET
,=.1
13
b. Icy runway.
Figure 1. Concluded.
Commercial Transport Aircraft Thrust Reverser Questionnaire
Part I - Thrust Reverser Utilization
Ii Why do you think thrust reversers are installed/required on commercial
transport airplanes?
[-] To reduce brake wear.
[--] To reduce taxi distance.
[-7 To reduce certified landing field lengths.
[---] To provide additional stopping force on wet, slushy and icy runways.
[--] For refused takeoffs (RTO).
[--] For taxiing on slushy and icy taxiways.
[--] For power back.
[_ Pilots want them.
[---] Other(s) i
.
Who
D
[]
E2
D
do you feel drives the need for thrust reversers on commercial transports?
The airlines (i.e. for safety).
The airframer (i.e. to meet field length specifications).
The FAA (regulations).
Other(s)
. What is your airline's policy toward the use of thrust reversers?
[---] Use on every landing.
[--] Use at pilots discretion.
F] Use only in emergency (RTO, landing hot/long).
[--] Other(s)
Do you have specific guidelines or "recommended operating procedures" for your
pilots to follow? [---] Yes [-7 No
Please attach an explanation or provide a copy of these guidelines if possible.
4. If your airline has a policy of not using thrust reversers except in emergencies,
what are typical reasons for their use?
. Do you have specific procedures for how thrust reversers should be operated (i.e.
deployment sequence, power level, cutoff speed, etc)?
[--] Yes [--] No
If yes, what are they? Maximum power % N1
Cutoff Speed knots
Other(s)
Please provide a copy of these procedures if possible.
Figure 2. Sample of questionnaire sent to the airlines.
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Commercial Transport Aircraft Thrust Reverser Questionnaire (cont)
1 Is the availability and use of thrust reversers considered in the setup of the
aircraft brake system antiskid features (i.e. maximum brake system pressure)?
Do you have a recommended procedure for using "Autobrakes" during landing?
Please explain:
1
o
o '
Approximately how many landings does your fleet make each year?
How many of them are on "icy" runways? How many are diversions
to alternate airports?
On average, how many refused takeoffs (RTO) does your fleet encounter each
year? How many of those are on "icy" runways?
What are your operational procedures/restrictions for landing/takeoff on "icy"
runways?
10. On average, how many occurrences of brake failure does your fleet encounter
each year?
11. Does your airline use thrust reversers for power back?
[-7 Yes [-I No
If so, with what type of airplane(s)?
12. Is aircraft operational field length critical to your route structure? Please explain:
13. Does on-time arrival at a terminal gate have any impact on the airline
instruction/pilot decision process on thrust reverser deployment to achieve
quicker egress to the taxiway? [] Yes [-7 No
Part II - Economic Considerations
14. Is your engine maintenance/servicing schedule based on engine cycles, engine
operating hours, or a combination of the two?
E] Cycles [-7 Hours [--I Combination
How does the use of thrust reversers affect your maintenance schedules?
Please explain:
Figure 2. Continued.
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Commercial Transport Aircraft Thrust Reverser Questionnaire (cont)
15. Has your airline evaluated the costs/benefits of thrust reverser usage (i.e. savings
in brake wear versus engine and reverser system maintenance, effect on
en__g_ine/airplane cruise performance)?
LJ Yes [] No
If yes, what are the trades as you see them?
16. Do you feel that thrust reversers are a cost effective means for aircraft
deceleration? Do they provide an adequate return on investment (ROB?
Please explain:
17. What is your estimate of the yearly cost per airplane of maintaining thrust
reversers for your fleet?
Part HI - Safety Considerations
18. Do you feel that thrust reverser are necessary for safe aircraft operations?
Please explain:
19. Are you aware of any instances where the use of thrust reversers prevented an
accident? Please explain:
20. To your knowledge, has there ever been any instances where an RTO was made
while an airplane's thrust reversers were inoperable or locked out?
[] Yes [] No
If so, were any problems encountered with stopping the airplane?
21. What type of thrust reverser problems does your fleet typicany encounter (i.e
cascade failures, inability to stow, inadvertent deployment). How often (say in
1000 landings) do such problems occur. Please comment:
Figure 2. Continued.
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Commercial Transport Aircraft Thrust Reverser Questionnaire (cont)
Part IV - Alternative Concepts
22. What is your opinion of removing thrust reversers from commercial transports,
assuming a more cost effective and safe altemative is available?
23. In your opinion, which of the following potential altematives to engine mounted
thrust reversers are most worthy of study:
[] Airframe mounted flap/thrust deflector system.
[--] Variable pitch fans.
[--I Reduce airplane landing speeds via improved high lift systems.
[-7 Airframe mounted high drag devices (i.e. chutes, overextended
flaps/spoilers, speed brakes).
[-7 Off airframe drag devices (i..e. arresting hook, nets, pickup devices, other
ground based systems).
[] Concepts which improve brake effectiveness (i.e. friction coefficient).
• ['-I _ Runway solutions (i.e. soft extensions, overrun nets).
[-7 Other(s)
Please provide the name and telephone number of a contact and add any additional
comments below.
...oeeee'o.eeeoe*oaa.e.ieeooiI.ee*.ee. Ieee. I.I..Oee...e-e'e''oee''ee'e'eoQ"
ee.eee..eee.ee.e.ele...****...eo...oeee..,...**.e,lo..ooo''''''e'*'oo''ea"
...eoeeeeeoeee.eoo..eI..eoo,....ei...ee.°.....eo.''elee''''oJo'''''''''''"
eee.ee..ea..o...ee.I.....e.*i..e...I...e...*,*....*oo.*..e°''''*'ee'I'I''e
o......ee.eeee.e,........o..°.*......''**''''" ooo''.'''*''leoeee''e'''.'."
.oi........o.o....**..e.e..ole.o°o°..*°....lee..e.°.*._*..''°'e'ee'_o'''*e
,...oee.eeeee......oee.*.oee..*ee.o...o.ee..o..ee.eoe..e-e'_''_''e'''''''
i_eeoeee.o_o.e_.eee..eoee_.o.......eooee*e.eee....._e''''''''''**'*''_'_'"
Qe'oe.eeeee_e..eee_e..e..e.*.oe...,e.eeo_.o.ee.e......e.,e.eeeo''e''e'o_'e"
..ee.e_.e._o.eee._e.o*e.e.*.e..e.*.e..,,.*eoe.e......,...*'°.°''_ee°*'*e'e
.o._le_o..oeeee..e..e.,._...eeo.,e.o.e..*.....°._*..e°.o,.o..oeleoe*.'_"
..o,*....._.....*.._......,eoeo''o*'ee'o=''''e''''eeo''eeeee'*_°''e''lee'"
....._eQ.o_.e.....,.e..e..e..°...**...*...°o_.e..o.e°e,ee'°'o_''ee'o'e'''"
.e_ee...._.ooee_eoo,ee..e..e.e...e...*.e.o,e...*...°'''''e''*ee'oo''e''oe°
Figure 2. Concluded.
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1) Why do you think thrust reversers are installed/requircd on commercial
transport airplanes?
A To reduce brake wear.
To reduce taxi distance.To reduce certified landing field lengths.
D To provide add/tional stopping force on wet, slushy and icy runways.
E For rejected takeoffs (RTO).
F For taxiing on slushy and icy tax/ways.
G For power back.
H Pilots want them.
I Other(s)
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
A,D
I; 'They increase the safety factor on all airfield operations."
D,E
D, I; 'To provide additional stopping force on dry runways."
D,H
A,D,E
C,D,E
A,D
D, F, I; "Directional steering on slippery taxiways and apron
area."
D
A,D
A_D
A,G
A,D
A,D,E
A, D, E, I:
D, I; "Add controllability margins.
less than perfect landings, etc."
A, D, E, H
A,C,D
A, D, I; "And as a safety device."
A, D, E, H
D,E,H
'To reduce landing roll in all weather conditions."
Allows safe completion of
Figure 3. Airline responses to question 1 (question in bold type)i
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2) Who do you feel drives the need for thrust reversers on commercial transports?
A The airlines (i.e. for safety).
B The airframer (i.e. to meet field length specifications).
C The FAA (regulations).
D Other(s)]
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline I0
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
B
D; "Airframer wants T/R's but not for field length. They are not
used for certified field lengths."
A
A, B; %Vhile thrust reversers are not required by the FAR's some
airlines (including Airline 4) have specified the use of reversers in
stopping distances performance criteria."
A
A,B,C
B,C
A
A
A
A
A
D; "Conservatism"
B,C
A
A
A; 'The airlines, increased safety margins since the FAA
certifies aircraft operation without reversers. Side benefits in
reduced brake costs. Brakes cost per landing are $5 for the 737 and
$128 for the 747."
A
B,C
A
A
A
Figure 4. Airline responses to question 2 (question in bold type).
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Reference: Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25.125
Definition of Actual Demonstrated Landing Distance = Distance Required to Stop
• From 50 ft at Vap p = 1.3 V s
• Using maximum wheel braking and speedbrakes (without thrust reversers)
• On a _l_ runway
Built in Margins for "Minimum Landing Field Length" are:
FAR Dry Runway Landing Distance
FAR Wet Runway Landing Distance
= 1.67 x Actual Demonstrated Distance
-- 1.15 x FAR Dry Runway Landing Distance
- 1.92 x Actual Demonstrated Distance
Credit for thrust reversers is not given in the FAR landing distances.
These margins are imposed to account for operational variables auch as:
• High touchdown speeds
• Long touchdown (i.e. high approach or extended flare)
•Wom brakes and tires
Figure 5. Definition of certifiedlanding distances.
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s) What is your airline's policy toward the use of thrust reversers?
A Use on every landing.
B Use at pilots discretion.
C Use only in emergency (RTO, landing hot/long).
D Other(s)
Do you have specific guidelines or "recommended operating procedures" for
your pilots to follow? Please provide a copy of these guidelines if possible.
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
C; Yes
A; Yes
A; Yes; 'We operate as per manufacturer's operating procedures
(DC9-30/MD-80/MD- 11/B747-200/A300 B6200)"
A; Yes; "Copies of Airline 4 operating procedures for each
aircraft in our fleet are attached for your detailed review."
B; Yes
A, B; Yes
A; Yes; "Airplane Flight Manual"
A; [samples of Flight Operations Manuals provided]
A; "Activate on every landing and use power reverse at pilots
discretion"; Yes; "Speed and EPR values to be used normally, not to
use high EPR's on certain noise sensitive airports except in
emergency, always use at least idle reverse and be prepared for power
use."
A; Yes
A; Yes
A
A; Yes
Yes;
[page from 747-400 AOM attached]
[page from MD-80 AOM attachedl
"Max reverse thrust on landing. Initiate reduction at 80
KIAS to reach reverse idle by 60 KIAS. Return to forward thrust after
engines have decelerated to reverse idle rpm."
A, B; Yes [guidelines for MD-11 provided]
A; Yes
A, "Normally on every landing but at pilots discretion."
[sample procedures attached]
A; Yes; "Boeing and Douglas guidelines."
A; Yes; "Reverse 'Idle' only in some situations."
A; Yes
A, B; Yes
A, B, 'Variable from idle reverse to full reverse."
Figure 6. Airline responses to question 3 (question in bold type).
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4) If your airline has a policy of not using thrust reversers except in emergencies,
what are typical reasons for their use?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"Airline 1 only operates BAe 146-200 aircraft (no reverse
capabilities) and DHC turboprops (with reverse pitch propellers). Icy
ramp and runways conditions would be typical situations for reverse
application."
n/a
n/a
"Question does not apply to Airline 4."
"Contaminated runways."
"Don't have such a policy."
"No"
n/a
[no response]
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Figure 7. Airline responses to question 4 (question in bold type).
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5) Do you have specific procedures for how thrust reversers should be operated (i.e.
deployment sequence, power level, cutoff speed, etc)?
If yes, what are they? Maximum power % NI
Cutoff Speed knots
Other(s)
Please provide a copy of these procedures if possible.
A/rline
Airline
Airline
Airline
mrlme
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
No
Yes; ~ 70% NI; 60 - 70 knots, use all engines
Yes; %Ve operate as per manufacturer's operating procedures."
Yes; "Procedures vary by fleet type, please see the attached
specific aircraft thrust reverser operating procedures for detail."
Yes; 60 knots
Yes; [no specifics provided]
Yes; 70% N1, reduce to 60°,5 NI at 40 knts (for 747, JT9D)
[page
Yes
Yes;
Yes;
Yes,
Yes;
Yes;
Yes;
Yes;
Yes;
Yes
Yes;
even
Yes;
Yes;
Yes;
Yes;
from 747 AFM provided]
[FOM's provided]
"Certain value up to max if needed";
"G/A" [ground accel]; 60 knots
[procedures provided]
84% N1 (max available); 40 knots
1.6 EPR. 60 knots
80 knots
"See question 3"
[procedures for MD-11 attached]
'Varies by type"; "Generally 80 knots"
[procedures provided]
"G/A"; "60/80 knots"; "Symmetric always / during RTO
with engine fire."
70% N1, 60 knots
100% N1, 70 knots
1.6 EPR, 80 knots
[sample of B-767 AOM provided]
Figure 8. Airline responses to question 5 (question in bold type).
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Figure 9. Typical engine operating levels and limitations during reverse thrust operation.
Q
c_
Carrier A
Aircraft Cutoff Soeeds [knotsl
An 70% N1 60-70
Carrier B DO} 1.6 EPR
727 84% N1
757/767 EC limited 1
DC- 10-30 95% N1
A300 EC limited
80, out by 60
80, Fwd Idle by 60
Idle Rev by 80, Fwd Idle by 60
Idle Rev by 80, Fwd Idle by 60
Idle Rev by 80, Fwd Idle by 60
Carrier C 747 70% N1
60% N1
60
40
Carrier D 727 1.6 EPR
747 70% N1
DC- 10-30 95% N1
80, Idle Rev by 60, Fwd Idle by 50
80, Idle Rev by 60, Fwd Idle by 50
80. Idle Rev by 60. Fwd Idle by 50
Carrier E 727 1.8 EPR
737-300/500 82% N1
757/767 EC limited
80
80, @ Idle Rev by 60
80, @ Idle Rev by 60
Flagnote 1 - Engine controller (EC) limits engine power available.
Figure I0. Sample of engine power levels and cutoff speeds used by some airlines.
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Source: B727 Operations Manual
t_
Cross'wind ComDonent
I
Reverse |I
vT_ec_otr"_ _ Reverse Thrust Side Force Component
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mmm
Cro_ Touch Start Brake= Off Straighten Real}ply Reverse
Wind Crab Down. Rovmr=e Reverse Roll Path Thrust and Full
Thrust Thrust With Rudder Brakes
Prior to Idle Steering
Touc_Oo_m And Differential
Braking
Figure 11. Weathervaning - Effect of reverse thrust on--a slippery runway with a crosswind.
e) Is the availability and use of thrust reversers considered in the setup of the
aircra/t brake system antiskid features (i.e. mJx4mum brake system pressure)? Do
you have a recommended procedure for using "Autobrakes" during Im.dlng?
Plesse explsln:
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
"Autobrake system deactivated on BAe-146 aircraft by
manufactures service bulletin."
"No - This is a design issue. The installation is done per the
relevant airframer manual"
"No (on brakes setup); Yes (for autobrakes procedure) for
B747 and A300."
'_res, the availability and use of thrust reversers is considered.
Autobraking systems are designed to provide the maximum stopping
force in conjunction with all other devices used to decelerate the
aircraft such that the total of autobrakes and reverse thrust combined
provide deceleration at a maximum rate. The recommended
procedure is specified in detail in the attached aircraft operating
instructions."
"No"
"Normally on 'Auto' brake installations these are used."
"Autobrake at 'minimum' setting is used every landing."
"Condition of antiskid is NOT factor in use of T/R - T/R is
recommended for each landing. See excerpts from DC-10 & MD-11
Flight Ops Manuals for relation between T/R and
Autobrakes/Autospofler."
"First part we don't understand what you mean by the question.
Second part, it is up to the pilots discretion."
[no response]
"Airline 11 believes that the availability and use of thrust
reversers might have no relationship with aircraft brake system
antiskid features. Airline 11 has no special recommended procedure
for using 'Autobrakes'."
"No - thrust reversers are not required for antiskid defects.
Autobrakes are used on every landing."
"On aircraft equipped with autobrakes, these shall be used on
slippery runways."
'_'es. Autobrakes are selected for all landings. MED or 3
settings are recommended for wet runways and on runway lengths of
9000 ft or less."
[procedures attached]
Figure 12. Airline responses to question 6 (question in bold type).
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Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
J
'Yes - Required on low visibility landings per certiflcation/Ops
Specs."
"Not for anti-skid systems. Aircraft with accelerometer based
autobrake systems, there are procedures to set the desired
deceleration rate(s)."
"No, Dry runway off, wet runway with field length restriction at
Capt's discretion, most use it."
"Normal operations - Dry runway = Min Autobrake,
- Wet runway - Med Autobrake."
'The thrust reversers is not considered like a deceleration in
any case of landing, then the thrust reversers will be always an
additional source in the landing performance."
[no response]
"See page 02.36.02 from 767 AOM."
Figure 12. Concluded.
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B757 & B7_7 A0M
Level 1-2 Minimum for braking on wet/slippery runway greater than 7000 feet
or on dry runways.
Level 3-4 - Medium when braking action is less than good or on wet/slippery
runways 7000 feet or less in length.
MAX - Maximum for Emergency braking.
ABS system is not required to be operational by Minimum Equipment List.
ABS system must be used (if operative) on wet/sllppery runways when braking action is "less
than good".
Whenever possible do not use brakes until below I00 knots - use manual braking.
MD11 A0M
MIN - when available runway length is > 9750 ft
MED - when available runway length is 7800 to 9750 ft
MAX - when available runway length < 7800 ft
MAX mode is not recommended on dry runways.
The use of ABS is recommended for landing on wet, slippery and contaminated runways or
runways close to minimum runway length.
B737-300/500 AOM
Level 1 - Use when nominal deceleration rate is suitable in routine operations.
Level 2 & 3 - Use when moderate deceleration rates are required for wet and
slippery runways or when roll out distance is limited.
Level MAX - Use when maximum deceleration rates are required. (Rate is less
than full manual braking).
MD-80 A0M
To reduce brake wear autobrakes are only used when deemed necessary. LAND MAX not
normally used on dry runways.
To achieve maximum brake effect for all runway conditions use autobrakes in LAND MAX.
When excessive runway length is available, delay brake action until speed is below 80 kts and
do not use autobrakes (to save brakes and reduce load on landing gear).
Figure 13. Examples of typical autobrake system settings and
pilot operating instructions.
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7) Approximately how many landings does your fleet make each year? How many of
them are on "ic_' runways? How many are diversions to alternate airports?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
42,000 cycles; 50%; 2.5%
120,000; < 1%; Almost none
500,000; "see item 9" [no data]; 1400 [0.3%]
"903,400 for 12 month period ending June 30, 1992.";
"Quantity unknown."; "In the 12 month period ending June 30, 1992
we experienced a total of 3206 diversions [0.4%] to alternate airports
out of the total 903,400 landings. Of the 3206 [diversions], 2463
[0.3%] were unplanned and of these, 1385 [0.2%] were weather
related. Further breakdown by specific weather conditions is not
available."
215,000; 20%; " ? " [unknown]
1,022,000; I -2%; 1 -2%
14,000; ~ 10%; ~0.1%
135,348; ~ 3.5%; - 10%
130,000; ~ 10,000 [8%]; 50 to I00 [0.1%]
12,000; ca 5%; > 1%
~II0,000; "Unknown"; "Zero (Apr. '91 - Mar. '92)"
32,200; [no response]; 4 [< 0.1%]
220,000; 20%; < 5%
A310 ~ 25000, 747 ~ 20,000; [no response]; "Statistics not
available."
250,000; ~ 5%; [no response]
338,000; "? "; "? "
"About 770,000 landings per year. About 800 [0.1%] of the
landings are made on "icy' runways during the winter season. There
are about 1700 [0.2%] diversions per year to alternate airports."
160,000; 400 [0.3%]; 500 or less [[0.3%]
4800; 1%; 0.5%
91,419 [no responses to other parts of question]
~ 60,000; Unknown; Unknown
160,000; 500- I000; insignificant
Figure 14. Airline responses to question 7 (question in bold type).
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s) On average, how many rejected takeoffs (RTO) does your fleet encounter each
year? How many of those are on '_cy _' runways?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline !7
5 to I0;
I0 max; Nil [0.01%]
27; "see item 9" [0.01%1
"Estimate 4 or 5 per year.";
[no response]
Few; None
5; Zero [0.04%1
"Unknown"; "Probably none"
5 to 10 max; 2 to 3 [0.01%]
I; Zero
8; "Unknown (Apr."91 -Mar.'92)"
16; [no response]
-I0; < 5 [< 0.01%]
"Nine"; "No Statistics"
-30; "no info" [0.01%]
-12; "Almost none" [< 0.01%]
3 [Percentage of RTO's = 0.02%]
"Unknown."
[0.01%]
[< 0.01%]
"Based on a recent 3 year period there was an average of 345
RTO's per year [0.04%]. There are no data on the number of RTO's on
icy runways." [Airline 17 was asked why their RTO rate was higher
than most of the other airlines responding. Their number is based on
actual pilot incident reports and includes all aborted T/O's from low
speed to V1. Airline 17 suggested that the definition used by other
airlines used may be different.]
Airline 18 48; Nil [0.03%]
Airline 19 3; Nil
Airline 20 [no response]
Airline 21 -20; None
Airline 22 15 - 20; Maybe I or 2.
Note: 0.01% -- 1/10,000 takeoffs
Figure 15. Airline responses to question 8 (question in bold type).
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9) What are your operational procedures/restrictions for landing/takeoff on "icy _'
runways?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
"Pilots discretion."
"A 1.15 factor applied to landing runway length. Icy runway
must be sanded prior to takeoff/landing. Reduced takeoff weights and
V1 for icy runways."
'"We do not allow operations on icy runways when the friction
coefficient is lower than 0.20. No statistics available."
'"Caries by fleet type - see attached operating procedures for
fleet specific information."
[no response]
'"Icy' runway is a broad term. If a runway is 'icy' there are special
runway weight numbers used."
"D.D.P.G. inoperative T/R is not permitted on 'icy' runways."
"See attachments" (727, 747, DC-10 & MD-11 FOM)
'_Veight corrections depending on friction coefficient, in T/O
also V1 reductions, cross wind limitations."
"Specific weight reduction from AOM, antiskid operating,
reduced VI."
"Landing/Takeoff performance on "ice" runway takes into
account the reverser effect." (Plot of % N1 vs IAS attached).
"Landing - Diversion should be considered if braking action is
poor and crosswind exceeds 15 knts. Takeoff - Severe weight
restrictions apply."
"As long as the gross weight permits T/O or landing."
"For T/O: 1. No reduced thrust, 2. no tail wind,
3. All reverses operational
For landing: I. Flaps 30, 2. Autothrotfles 3 or higher,
3. No overweight landing, 4. No tailwind
[procedures attached]
'Same as manufacturers recommendations."
"See the attached pages from the "Winter Operations Bulletin'."
"Basically according to Douglas and Boeing recommendations;
Max crosswind 10 knots; Reversers must be O.K."
'_I reduction. Weight (TOW) reduction. Limits on crosswind.
OR Prohibit takeoff ff conditions warrant."
Figure 16. Airline responses to question 9 (question in bold type).
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Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
'The limitation for takeoff that we consider is 1/2 pg. [inch?] of
sleet or the equivalent for dry snow. For a long landing the thrust
reversers are used at pilot discretion with some knowledge about the
care for use in slippery runway conditions [i.e. weather vaning]."
"No takeoff or landings on icy runways (friction coefficient below
0.15)."
Wariable. A320 requires operative thrust reversers ff runway
contaminated. DC-9 requires additional 500 feet over normal
required landing distance if one reverser inoperative. In additon we
limit cross wind as function of 'slipperiness'."
Figure 16. Concluded.
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10) On average, how many occurrences of brake failure does your fleet encounter each
year?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline I0
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"Zero"
"Nil"
"83"
"No total failures (all brakes on one aircraft) but some failures of
individual wheel brakes. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) allows
dispatch of an aircraft with one or more individual brakes inoperative.
This varies by aircraft and is detailed in the attached MEL manual
pages."
[no response]
"Few"
"Practically zero"
"See attached printouts for 1991"
"15 to 25"
">I"
"10 (steel brakes only)"
"Nil to date"
"< 5"
"Nil"
"Complete brake failures very seldom, we can recall 2 incidents
in several years."
"8 to 10"
"None"
"5 considering one or other system, Nil both systems"
"Zero"
"Around five failures per year."
"None"
"Can only think of 2 or 3 in last 15 years."
Figure 17. Airline responses to question 10 (question in bold type).
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11) Does your airline use thrust reversers for power back? If so, with what type of
alrp ne(s)?
Airline l
Airline 9.
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 19.
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 115
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 9.0
Airline 21
Airline 9.2
No "(only ff absolutely no other option is available)"
No
No
Yes; "MDS0, 79.7, F100. Power back is approved on the 757
aircraft but is not yet used."
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
"Formally allowed, but never used."
No
No
Yes "(limited)"; "DC9, MD80, 727"
'Thrust reversers can be used for power back. However, because
of various economic and ground safety concerns, Airline 17 rarely
uses the procedure."
No
No
No
No
No
Figure 18. Airline responses to question 11 (question in bold type).
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12) Is aircraft operational field length critical to your route structure? Please explain.
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"Due to BAe-146 not having reversers, icy ramp and runway
conditions must be handled cautiously."
"Some routes takeoff distance governs weight for long haul."
"Some airports in our network are critical from runway length
standpoint."
"No, we do not select an aircraft or city pair based on runway
lengths or stopping performance."
Wee fly into many small airports where field length is critical."
"In some cases - a very low percentage of the operation."
"Most direct flights Israel to U.S. are field length limited!"
'_res. Our primary HUB is at an airport with relatively short
runways which often limits our takeoff weights and therefore our
payloads"
'_/es, DC-10/MD-11 long flight at max. TOGW and hot airfields,
some charter destinations with short fields."
[no response]
"Most airports we fly have enough field length for our flights on
dry runway, but field length is critical on slippery runway."
'_res. A large percentage of operations are long haul sectors and
optimum revenue/payload capability must be achieved.
"On certain domestic flights, especially in Norway, during icy
conditions with short runways."
'_res for long haul routes such as SIN-LHR."
"No"
'_res at approximately 50% of airports."
'_res in some cases. The 747 is field length limited much of the
time. The smaller 2-engine 737 tends to be landing weight limited
frequently."
"Low impact on payload/safety; 2% of all runways are less than
6500 feet long"
"No (currently)"
'_res, about 20% of airports are class 6 according to I.C.-A-O.
classification."
"Not always, very seldom."
"No. Generally the airports we operate into have sufficient
runway length."
Figure 19. Airline responses to question 12 (question in bold type).
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is} Does on-time arrival at a terminal gate have any impact on the airline
Instruction/pilot decision process on thrust reverser deployment to achieve.
•quicker egress to the tax/way?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Aidine 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes;
Yes;
No
Yes
"(Sometimes I am sure it does}"
"Some, but safety first."
No
No
No
No
No
"Probably. No quantitative data to substantiate, but observations
indicate that this does happen frequently. Often, the airport tower
will ask if a flight will expedite the egress from the runway. '°
No
No
No
No
No
Figure 20. Airline responses to question 13 (question in bold type).
43
14) Is your engine maintenance/servicing schedule based on engine cycles, engine
operating hours, or a combination of the two? How does the use of thrust
reversers affect your maintenance schedules? Please explain.
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Cycles; n/a
Combination; 'The scheduled overhauls of reversers is govemed
by a combination of hours/cycles which accounts for the fact that they
are deployed on every landing."
Combination; [no explanation given]
Combination; "On engines which have thrust reversers attached
to the engine, the reverser is maintained during normal engine shop
visit. Reversers which are attached to aircraft pylon have set hour
controlled scheduled maintenance which coincides with heavy
aircraft visits to main base."
Combination; "Not much."
Combination; 'Very little effect."
Hours
'Thrust reversers do not affect our engine maintenance
schedules."
Combination
"Higher usage, more maintenance."
Combination; "As far as we experience the use of thrust
reversers do not affect maintenance schedules."
Combination; "Reduced brake system requirements."
Hours; "Hard hour limit overhaul, maintenance actions based on
checks. If wear appears, maintenance actions take place."
Combination; "Our maintenance schedules are based on our own
experience as well as P&W recommended maintenance intervals."
Combination; "It does only ff we have trouble with."
Does not affect, since we use reversers on 100% of landings."
Hours; "Reverser use is not considered in the maintenance
schedule. Airline 17 uses sampling programs and reliability analyses
to determine the engine maintenance schedule. The reverser system
has its own program more closely tied to the aircraft maintenance
program."
"No effect at all."
Hours
Cycles; "According with our maintenance area the reverser use
does not affect the maintenance schedules."
Figure 21. Airline responses to question 14 (question in bold type).
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Airline 21
Airline 22
Combination; "No affect."
Combination; "It creates scheduled maintenance. For aircraft
like DC-8-73, which permits reverse in flight, a high flight idle
situation in the past resulted in greater use of In-flight reverse with
resulting maintenance costs. ReducIng excessively high flight idle
setting gave immediate reduction in reverser maintenance costs."
Figure 21. Concluded.
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15) Has your airline evaluated the costs/benefits of thrust reverser usage (i.e. savings
in brake wear versus engine and reverser system maintenance, effect on
engine/airplane cruise performance)?
If yes, what are the trades as you see them?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
No
"Early deployment of the reverser reduces brake wear as the
reverser can remove large amounts of kinetic energy from the aircraft
at high speeds."
No
"During 1992 Airline 4 will spend approximately equal amounts
of money to maintain thrust reversers and brakes on our fleet and,
based on the fact that thrust reversers supply only 20 to 25% of the
total deceleration force, it is apparent that brake usage is more
beneficial from a maintenance cost standpoint. However, it is widely
recognized that brake wear increases significantly if reverse thrust is
not used to decelerate the aircraft."
Yes; "It is cheaper to use brakes - especially on A/C with carbon
brakes where hard braking is not any harder on the pads than light
braking."
No
No
No
"Fuel price dependent, efficiency of reverse thrust."
No
Yes; 'We evaluated the brake wear and temperature with no
reverser operation. Our evaluation shows the brake wear rate
increase approximately 25 percent and additional stay time and/or
ground equipment for brake cooling are required. Cost impact on our
B747, 60 aircrafts, is over two million US dollars per year." [$2
Million/60 AC -- $33,000 per AC per year. Interpreted this as a brake
cost.]
Yes; 'Thrust reverser cost vs brake usage and shown to be cost
effective. Brakes and landing gear are the most expensive
maintenance cost apart from engines."
No
No
No
Yes; "Airline 16 philosophy has been to spend more on brae
wear and cost to reduce reverser maintenance and cost - higher fuel
cost of recent years enter into the decisions."
Figure 22. Airline responses to question 15 (question in bold type).
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Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
'Tes. Weight of the reverser system = increased fuel bum/loss of
potential payload. Reverser maintenance cost vs brake wear cost."
No; "Anyway consistent less brake wear."
No
No
No
No
Figure 22. Concluded.
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16) Do you feel that thrust reversers are a cost effective means for aircra/t
deceleration? Do they provide an adequate return on investment (ROI)? Please
explain.
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline I0
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
'_'es. In our northern environment, I would definitely consider
them a cost effective system."
'Yes. Due the increased safety factor."
'_res. The T/R is an effective means for A/C deceleration but we
do not think is offering adequate ROI since it is very expensive
equipment with low reliability (see final comments)."
"Given that there are no alternatives to thrust reversers it is
difficult to say reverser ROI is or is not adequate but it is fair to say
that reverser ROI is much less than brake ROI when comparing the
amount of deceleration force provided by each systems."
"Not cost effective at major airports, required at northern bases."
"Difficult to measure."
"Unknown."
'_Ne don't pay extra for thrust reversers, so an 'ROI' has never
been considered. As long as they are used judiciously (i.e. don't
overboost the engine or allow debris to be re-ingested) so as not to
harm the engines while reducing brake wear. This has not been
quantified."
"Not very effective and very costly, but necessary."
"No. Too complex, heavy, noisy."
'_Ve feel that thrust reversers are a cost effective means for
brake consumption."
'"ires, since they are cheaper than brakes and require less
servicing as regards off-time, and do not use any consumable
material."
'_res, as we can use them formally when we calculate T/O
weights and landing weights on slippery runways. Operation would
not be possible without reversers on existing aircraft fleet."
"No. The reversers are heavy to carry around, and it contributes
little to aircraft deceleration except only on contaminated runways.
However, we recognise its contribution to safety."
"No, but improves safety margin."
"As mentioned in question 15 above, the management of reversers vs.
brakes is always a factor in the overall economics of aircraft stopping
decisions. Reversers in conjunction with brakes, are effective."
Figure 23. Airline responses to question 16 (question in bold type).
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Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"It costs Airline 17 Airlines in excess of $3 million annually in
fuel to carry thrust reversers on over 500 aircraft. [$6,000 per AC]
Considering the added ground control and stopping capability
provided under varying runway surface conditions for the flight crew,
this "insurance policy' will return the cost to carry on a single
incident. Yes, it is felt they do provide an adequate return on
investment."
'Tes. No detailed data but definitely maintenance costs are well
below brake wear associated costs."
"No. Fan rub increase, turbine life reduction, compressor rub.
All shorten on-wing life of engine."
"As a safety device all the operations have benefits and the cost
is considered."
'Tes, reduces brake wear."
"Don't know. Have not costed the alternatives."
Figure 23. Concluded.
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17) What is your estimate of the yearly cost per airplane of Tn.ln,Aln*nd thrust
reversers for your fleet?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
n/a
"Not known."
"Around $100,000 per A/C."
"Approximately $31,000 per aircraft or $21 million for fleet in
1992. This, of course, varies with age and type of reverser. The
DC10 reversers are most expensive to maintain while MD11 and F100
reversers are currently the least expensive to maintain (these are
newest aircraft in fleet).
"In addition to thrust reverser maintenance costs, Airline 4 will
spend approximately $20 million during 1992 to maintain the brakes
and related systems on our fleet. Brake maintenance cost varies by
fleet and by the type of brake, steel or carbon. Carbon brakes offer
significant weight savings which translates into more payload,
however, they have the disadvantage of being much more costly to
maintain. Brake maintenance costs are expected to increase as new
aircraft with carbon brakes enter service in our fleet while older
aircraft with steel brakes are retired from service."
[no response]
"Unknown."
"For a 747, $30,000 per airplane per year."
"A cost breakdown at this level is NOT made."
"$20,000/airplane, but big variation between airplane."
n/a
"It is difficult to estimate the yearly cost (maintenance cost of
thrust reverser is not traced separately from total maintenance cost)."
"$100/flight approximately or $40,000/year."
"Approx. $20 mill" [assume total fleet cost for 107 AC,
$187,000/AC/year]
"Study has not been conducted, '°
[no response]
"$I0,000 to $45,000 per year [average = $27,500] depending on
type of aircraft."
"$12,000/aircraft/year annual cost. Includes on-aircraft
checks/repairs (annual) and shop overhaul once every 6-8 years
averaged into the annual expense."
Figure 24. Airline responses to question 17 (question in bold type).
5O
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
AiHine 21
Airline 22
n/a
[no response]
"DC-10: $550,000, B-727: $220,000."
[very high, relative to other airlines]
[no response]
'Total cost is about $2,700,000. We have about I00 aircraft.
Therefore yearly cost per aircraft = $27,000. However, B-767 is
much higher than others."
Figure 24. Concluded.
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18) Do you feel that thrust reversers are necessary for safe aircraft operations? Please
explai_
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
"No" [this airline operates airplanes without thrust reversers]
'_res - They provide a positive and independent means of
stopping the aircraft."
'_res (see item 1 and 2)."
'_res, without them brakes-only stopping performance margins
are not adequate to provide the degree of safety desired by operators.
Also, reversers are very important for directional control on icy
runways."
"On the other hand it should be noted that on twin engine
aircraft which have wing mounted high bypass ratio engines the
hazard of an in-flight reverser deployment which may severely
compromise flight safety far outweighs any benefit from increased
landing stopping margins or better directional control on icy runways.
Also, triple redundancy of systems to prevent in-flight reverser
deployment will cause departure delays which will exceed stopping
value."
'_res, in some instances. Especially in the north where ice and
snow are present 6 months of the year."
'Yes - just puts on added stopping factor."
'Yes. T/R provides redundancy braking on: 1/wet and icy
runways, 2/brake and/or tire failure, 3/refused takeoff."
"No."
"In slippery conditions they are the only means to produce
forces for aircraft steering."
"Any means of quick deceleration is necessary for safe
operations."
'Thrust reverser is necessary for takeoff/landing on slippery
runway."
'They are redundant system but are certainly valued."
'Today it is on existing aircraft fleet."
'Yes, for operations on runways where the braking coefficient
have been reduced by natural forces."
'_[es, it is an additional safety margin, since reverse is not
included in calculation for takeoff abortion."
"ABSOLUTELY i - provide additional margin of safety."
Figure 25. Airline responses to question 18 (question in bold type).
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Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
'The aircraft is certified for field length and 'safe' operation
without the reversers. See the attached copy of the FAA Advisory
Circular dealing with aircraft certification. Reversers do make
operations 'safer' by giving the flight crews more options. Without
them or something equivalent, there probably would be more
restrictions on operations on wet runways, etc.
'Tes, additional and efficient stopping power."
"Perhaps not necessary. But they do provide a greater safety
margin."
'_'es, because the reverser system provides an important
deceleration without contact with the ground, it means the reverser
deceleration will not be affected by runway conditions like water, ice
or rubber contamination."
"No"
'_es. Existing retardation systems apart from thrust reversers
are not adequate for slippery runway operations which are relatively
common in Canada during winter months."
Figure 25. Concluded.
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19) Are you aware of any instances where the use of thrust reversers prevented an
accident? Please explain.
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline I0
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
'_es. A DHC-8 taxied to terminal in high winds and icy ramp.
Reverse application prevented aircraft from colliding with boarding
ramp."
'Tes" [no explanation given]
'%Ve experienced cases where during a landing an overrun was
avoided and during taxi a collision prevented by use of reverse thrust
in condition of unreported slippery surfaces."
'Tes, many incidents of using reversers to help stop an aircraft
in runway overrun situations where it is believed that not using
reversers would have led to much more aircraft damage and possible
passenger injury."
[no response]
"No"
'Tes! In all last year 5 RTO stops. T/R was used and in all cases
airplane came to rest in last 300 feet of runway."
"No"
"Many, mostly veeroffs from runway or taxiways."
"No"
"No such instances have been recorded."
"Not within our operations."
"Every landing on runways with poor braking action."
"No. Since it is our policy to use reverse thrust at all times, we
are unable to comment on whether the non use of reverse thrust
would have caused an accident/incident.
"No"
'Tes - on many instances with slick runways and taxiways."
'There were '2' instances of hydroplaning in the past year. The
use of reversers prevented the airplane from leaving the runway."
"A/C was oriented to hold on mid-runway loop. On a different
language [the tower cleared another A/C for takeoff. Wing tip collision
was imminent. Avoided by our Capt's decision to power back -4
meters (B737-200, 1992)"
[no response]
"In some instances, contaminated runways, reversers have been
used as a last resort to stop."
Figure 26. Airline responses to question 19 (question in bold type).
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Airline 21
Airline 22
[no responsel
'There are many occasions when most of the runway is used
even though full reverse is used. If reverse had not been used the
airplane would have gone off the runway. Do you consider this an
instance?"
Figure 26. Concluded.
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To your knowledge, has there ever been any instances where an RTO was made
while an airplane's thrust reversers were inoperable or locked out? If so, were
any problems encountered with stopping the airplane?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
No
'_Ne do not operate with more than one reverser locked out."
No
"Don't know of any instances, however, MEL allows no more than
one reverser to be inoperative or locked out so any given aircraft
would have one or more reversers operable at all times."
Yes; "No"
No
No
"No one can recall such an event."
"Don't know, but probably on dry runways and from lower
speeds."
No
No
Yes; "No problems since a maximum of 1 reverser can be locked
out and power/reverse thrust is applied symmetrically."
No
No
No
Yes; "No - because aircraft is certified to stop without credit
for thrust reversers."
No
Yes; "No - at least two incidents at slippery & wet runways
where reversers played major part at stopping A/C"
No; "Not all thrust reversers."
No
No
No
Figure 27. Airline responses to question 20 (question in bold type).
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21) What type of thnnt reverser problems does your fleet typically encounter (i.e
cascade failures, inability to stow, inadvertent deployment). How often (say in
1000 landings) do such problems occur?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
n/a
737-200 = 2/Khr, 737-300 = 0.3/Khr, 747-100 = 10.7/Khr;
Hours/Cycle Ratio: 737 = 1:1, 747 = 3.2:1 [assume cycle = landing]
"Around 0.07 x I000 landings we encounter problems such as
inability to deploy or inability to stow. Another problem of the
modern sound suppressed T/R is the delamination or disbonding of
the honeycomb panels."
"Cascade failures and inadvertent deployment are very rare in
our fleet. Inability to stow occurs occasionally on our DCI0 fleet and
when it involves number 2 engine we experience a lengthy delay and
sometimes cancellation. Problems with indicating systems and
reverser mechanisms/systems are more numerous."
"A particular indication system problem which has occurred in
our fleet is one that causes pilot reports and maintenance delays due
to 'false' reverser unlock and ISO valve indications or lights flickering.
These problems occurred across one manufacturers fleet of Airline 4
aircraft a total of 28 times during a recent one year study period.
This points to the inadequacy of a major portion of the indication
system to provide the flight crew with information as to whether an
uncommanded reverser deployment is taking place."
'The rate of occurrence of problems are tracked by the number
of pilot reports and the number of delays associated with ATA System
78, thrust reverser, and vary from fleet to fleet. For example, the
pilot report (PIREP) rate ranges from 1.1 to 3.5 per 1000 flying hours
while the delay rate ranges from 0.2 to 1.74 per 1000 landings.
These are 12 month rates thru June, 1992."
'The operating cost impact resulting from reverser related
delays and cancellations amounts to approximately $2.7 million for
the above mentioned time period."
"Failure to deploy, unable to stow. 1.5/Khrs [incident
occurrence plots provided]
"Really don't have these kinds of records."
'T/R system, pilot report rate: 6 per 1000 flt hrs. Typical
failure: Actuation problem, i.e. inability to extend or stow."
Figure 28. Airline responses to question 21 (question in bold type).
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Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline 10
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"Significant
list of 'T/R
727-100:
727-200:
DC- 10-10:
DC- 10-30:
level of ancillary component failures."
squawks" from 1991]
2 per 10,000 landings
I per 10,000 landings
7 per 10,000 landings
8 per 10,000 landings
[provided a
"Mentioned problems very seldom."
"No problems (yet)."
'There are fault indication, misrigging, etc. 3.2 squawks / 1000
departures on average."
"Primarily inability to stow and inability to deploy. Problems
occur between 5 to 10 landings per 1000 depending upon aircraft
type. Between I and 2 cascade failures per 1000 landings."
"Mainly indication problems."
Occurences of inability to stow after deployment and REV
UNLOCK indication in flight."
"Most of the problems are indication malfunctions."
"Inability to stow, light indication problems, hydraulic leaks,
hinge pin and bushing wear, translating sleeve ball screw and cable
failures, blocker door failures. Say 10 in 1000 landings."
WCon't go into reverse - 40%; Won't stow on the ground - 30%;
Indication system - 21%; Blocker doors/links - 9%.
"Cascade failures and inability to stow ok - inadvertent
deployment never - 0.6 per I000 landings."
"Occasional blocker door stay/wear failure."
"DC-10 adjusting cables with a dividend result of 0.005. B-727
mlcroswitch failures with a dividend result of 0.002."
"Actuator light on, 0.3 cases per 1000 landings."
'%Ve used to experience JT9D-7R4 cascade failures in the '83 to
'85 years but this problem has been corrected."
Figure 28. Concluded.
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What is your opinion of removing thrust reversers from commercial transports,
assuming a more cost effective and safe alternative is ava/lable?
Airline 1
Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
Airline 6
Airline 7
Airline 8
Airline 9
Airline I0
Airline 11
Airline 12
Airline 13
Airline 14
Airline 15
Airline 16
"In agreement providing cost effective and safety are
paramount."
"If this were true, then it would be attractive. It is unlikely
however to prove economic to retrofit such a system - see
comments."
"In such a case there would be no objection for thrust reversers
removal, however it should not be excluded to consider such new
devices not as alternative but as additional (see comment)."
"Any alternative would have to be thoroughly demonstrated and
proven reliable to even be considered. There would be many
obstacles to removing existing thrust reversers from in service
commercial transport aircraft, not the least of which would be
modification and certification issues and costs."
[no response]
'Would not be in favor."
"Neutral"
'Within the parameters of equal or greater safety, cost
effectiveness, our position would range from interest to unbridled
enthusiasm - depending on the magnitude of the parameters."
'_'es, if safe and cost effective, but new device must produce
forces for directional control on slippery runway, also in low speed
region where aerodynamic means not functioning."
"I very much favor the idea."
"Negative unless the alternative is more reliable."
%Ve do not believe that operating pilots would agree to their
removal, even though the thrust reverser system is a redundant
safety system."
"It's OK, but the features must be independent of runway
friction."
"Can't comment unless the manufacturer spells out the
alternatives in detail."
"As long as same effectiveness with a new system, Airline 15 is
positive about removing T/R."
WCould agree to remove only if same level of safety is maintained
but doubt it can be done."
Figure 29. Airline responses to question 22 (question in bold type).
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Airline 17
Airline 18
Airline 19
Airline 20
Airline 21
Airline 22
"If the proposed new system is as effective as current reversers
and less expensive, particularly in fuel consumption, Airline 17 would
support it. As you see from our comments on questions 18 and 19,
flight crews occasionally need something to help overcome
unforeseen events or less than perfect techniques. 'Something to
broaden the operating band'."
'Yes OK."
'This would be an operational and engineering advantage,
compared to current thrust reverser system limitations, problems
and effectiveness."
"Any change with better performance and cost always will be
seen in a good way, but always with taking care about the flight safety."
"Appreciated"
"Good idea."
Figure 29. Concluded.
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ss) In your opinion, which of the following potential alternatives to engine mounted
thrust reversers are most worthy of study:
A Airframe mounted flap/thrust deflector system.
B Variable pitch fans.
C Reduce airplane landing speeds via improved high lift systems.
D Airframe mounted high drag devices (i.e. chutes, overextended
flaps/spoilers, speed brakes).
E Off airframe drag devices (i..e. arresting hook, nets, pickup devices, other
ground based systems).
F Concepts which improve brake effectiveness (i.e. friction coefficient).
G Runway solutions (i.e. soft extensions, overrun nets).
H Other(s)
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
Airline
1 C
2 [no response, but see additional comments]
3 B,F
4 B, C, D, F; "Cost and reliability would be high airline concerns."
5 C,D,F
6 B,C
7 D
8 C,F
9 B
I0 A, B
11 B,D
12 B
13 D
14 C, F, I; "More effective/positive steering control on slippery
surfaces."
15 B,D,F
16 B, C, F: "NO! to item E."
17 B, C, "A new approach to the problems involved in controlling
and stopping aircraft on varied surfaces/conditions."
18 B, G, H; "Should not be tire related ones."
19 C,D,F
20 D
21 C,F
22 A, B, D, F
Figure 30. Airline responses to question 23 (question in bold type).
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Airline 2
Airline 3
Airline 4
Airline 5
"Any alternative to a thrust reverser must be equally reliable and safe.
It must also provide an independent, positive (i.e. non drag)
decelerating force. Off runway devices (nets, etc) appear dangerous
for commercial aviation, but may be worthwhile as a further addition.
I would suggest that a more fruitful area of study would be to attempt
to reduce the weight of the existing reverser (e.g. the use of
composite or hollow cascade vanes). Modem reversers are generally
a reliable and simple means of providing positive deceleration to the
aircraft and I would be reluctant to move away from the basic
concept."
'To provide an incentive to develop more reliable and effective
retarding devices, including the present thrust reverser system, some
credit should be given in the regulations to calculate the accelerate-
stop distances on dry, wet and contaminated runways. This would
determine positive effects on ROI."
"Since it appears likely that this study was initiated as a result of the
Air Lauda accident and Boeing findings related to that accident we
offer the following comments on evolving design requirements for
existing and future aircraft:
757 and 767 - add third level of protection (sync shaft lock),
inhibit autostow inflight, incorporate additional locking actuator
with proximity switch, and modify existing reversers such that
aircraft will tolerate deployment in flight.
A300 - Airline 4 initiated thrust reverser health check, and a
design review to see if third lock is required, and will apply
'lessons learned from Boeing experience'.
Future aircraft - Airline 4 will not accept aircraft (e.g. 777) unless:
Normal pilot skill retains control with thrust reverser deployed
(engine at idle) at cruise •speed and altitude.
Normal pilot skill retains control at max. landing weight with one
thrust reverser deployed and engine shut down."
"I cannot answer your operational questions as well as our pilots. If
you want answers as to why pilots want thrust reversers you should
canvas the various pilots organizations."
'Target type T/R's on B737 are very effective, quite reliable and
relatively easy to maintain. High bypass ratio cascade type reversers
require more maintenance, have a higher snag rate and are much less
effective. They are probably not cost effective." [provided plots of
"snag rates"]
Figure 3 I. Additional comments made by the airlines.
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Airline 9
Airline 13
Airline 16
"Directional control on slippery runways with low speed is very
important (taxiing, apron area)."
"Investigate runway accidents/incidents during 70's and 80's where
F28 (no thrust reversers) was used in domestic network (to my
knowledge)."
'The requirements for new braking devices are: - Light weight,- Low
maintenance costs, - Effective on slippery runways (mu below 0.20)"
"Relative to the brake effectiveness comment in item 23 -- This is a
sore spotll We have a brake certified on the aircraft and it remains
forever. Major improvements require re-certification and high cost --
so are not done. For example, the 727 has had the same lining for 20
years -- the 747, L1011, and DC-9's are the same. We do not see the
latest state-of-the-art improvements. The airlines are locked in --
and suffer."
Figure 31. Concluded.
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